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Plaintiff was discharged from his position as Chief of Police for
the City of Independence, Missouri.' He was given no reason for
the dismissal 2 and received only a written notice from the city
manager stating that the dismissal was made pursuant to a
provision of the city charter.3 Plaintiff subsequently brought suit 4 in
federal district court under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, 5 alleging that he had
been discharged under color of state law without notice of reasons
I. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 629 (1980). Owen and the city managerhad a
dispute over Owen's administration of the police department property room when a handgun, listed
in the property room records as having been destroyed, turned up in the possession of a felon in
Kansas City, Missouri. The results of an investigation showed that the records were insufficient to
permit an adequate accounting of the property room goods, but that there was no evidence of any
criminal acts or of any violation of state or municipal law in the administration of the property room.
The city manager then asked Owen to resign as police chief and take another position within the
department. Owen refused and was subsequently discharged. The city council voted to release the
investigative reports to the news media. The local press gave prominent coverage both to the city
council's actions and to Owen's discharge, linking the discharge to the investigation. Id. at 625-29.
2. Id. at 629. Owen sent a letter to the city manager demanding written notice of the charges
against him and a public hearing with a reasonable opportunity to respond to those charges. Id. at
626-27.
3. Id. at 629. Under section 3.3(1) of the city's charter, the city manager has sole authority to
"jajppoint, and when deemed necessary for the good of the service, lay off, suspend, demote, or
remove all directors, or heads of administrative departments and all other administrative officers and
employees ofthe city." Id. at 625 n.2.
4. Id. at 630. Owen named the City of Independence, the city manager, and the members of the
city council in their official capacities as defendants. Id.
5.42 U.S.C. S 1983 (1976). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

and without a hearing, in violation of his constitutional rights to
procedural and substantive due process. 6 Plaintiff sought
declaratory and injunctive relief, including backpay, a hearing on
his discharge, and attorney's fees. 7 The district court entered
judgment for defendants, 8 and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit initially reversed. 9 Defendants petitioned for
review of the decision of the court of appeals. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded for further
consideration10 in light of its decision in Monell v. Department of Social
Services. On remand, the court of appeals reaffirmed its original
decision that the city had violated plaintiff's rights under the
fourteenth amendment, but held that all of the defendants,
including the city, were entitled to qualified immunity from
liability. 12 The United States Supreme Court again granted review,
and held that a municipality has no immunity from liability for its
constitutional violations under the Civil Rights Act and may not
assert the good faith of its officers as a defense.' 3 Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
The issue of municipal liability under section 1983 was first
addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape'4
in - 1961. In Monroe, the Court based its theory of municipal
immunity from section 1983 liability upon the legislative history of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871.15 The Court's analysis focused on the
6. 445 U.S. at 630.
7. Id.
8. Id. The district court held that Owen had no property interest in his employment which
would entitle him to procedural and substantive due process rights; that he was not deprived of an
interest in liberty in connection with his discharge; that the city had established a good faith defense
by proof of the good faith of the individual defendants who had acted as agents and officers of the
city; and that section 3.3(1) of the city charter, making administrative department heads
dischargeable only "when necessary for the good of the service," did not impliedly provide the police
chief with right to notice and a hearing, but rather was persuasive evidence that such rights were not
intended to exist. Owen v. City oflndependence, 421 F. Supp. 1110, 1120-25 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
9. 445 U.S. at 631. The court of appeals agreed with the district court that, under Missouri law,
Owen possessed no property interest in his continued employment as police chief. The court
concluded, however, that the city's allegedly false public accusations had blackened Owen's name
and reputation, thus depriving him of liberty without due process of the law. The court also ruled
that the good faith of the city was not a defense. Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 940
(8th Cir. 1977).
10. Owen v. City ofIndependence, 438 U.S. 902 (1978).
11. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
12. Owen v. City of Independence, 589 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1978). The Supreme Court's
decisions in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972), crystallized the rule establishing the right to a name-clearing hearing for a government
employee allegedly stigmatized in the course of his discharge. The Court, however, decided those
two cases two months after the discharge in Owen. Thus, the court of appeals reasoned that the city
officials could not have been aware of the police chief's right to a name-clearing hearing and that the
city should not be charged with predicting the future course of constitutional law. Therefore, the
court extended the limited immunity which the district court had applied to the individual
defendants to cover the city as well, because the officials acted in good faith and without malice. 589
F.2d at 337-38.
13. 445 U.S. at 657.
14. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
15. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-91 (1961). The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was enacted to
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congressional debates on the Sherman Amendment, which would
have made municipalities liable for damages to any persons injured
by "persons riotously or tumultously assembled together" with the
'intent to deprive anyone of their constitutional rights.16 In light of
the amendment's defeat, 17 the Monroe Court held that "ftlhe
response of Congress to the proposal to make municipalities liable
for certain actions . . .was so antagonistic that we cannot believe
that the word 'person' was used in this particular Act to include
them." ' 18 The Court concluded that local governments were not
intended to be among the "persons" to whom section 1983 liability
applies. 19
In subsequent cases, the Court rejected attempts to modify
Monroe, and municipal liability under section 1983 continued to
be barred. 20 Precluded from asserting a section 1983 cause of action
under Monroe, individuals brought suit against municipalities
enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment. Section 1 of the 1871 Act is now codified in 42
U.S.C. S 1983 (1976).
16. 365 U.S. at 188 (quoting CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1871)). As originally
proposed, the Sherman Amendment provided:
That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building, barn, or granary shall be
unlawfully or feloniously demolished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed, wholly or in
part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; or if any person
shall unlawfully and with force and violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or killed
by any persons riotously and tumultously assembled together; and if such offense was
committed to deprive any person of any right conferred upon him by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, or -o deter him or punish him for exercising such right,
or by reason of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude, in every such case
the inhabitants of the county, city, or parish in which any of the said offenses shall be
committed shall be liable to pay full compensation to the person or persons damnified
b$,such offense if living, or to his widow or legal representative if dead; and such
compensation may be recovered by such person or his representative by a suit in any
court of the United States of competent jurisdiction in the district in which the offense
was committed, to be in the name of the person injured, or his legal representative,
and against said county, city or parish. Any execution may be issued on a judgment
rendered in such suit and may be levied upon any property, real or personal, of any
person in said county, city or parish, and the said county, city or parish may recover
the full amount of such judgment, costs and interest, from any person or persons
engaged as principal or accessory in such riot in an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction.
365 U.S. at 188 n.38 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1871)). As originally
introduced by the Senate, the amendment would have held all inhabitants of a municipality liable for
civil rights violations occurring within the municipality. When this version was rejected by the
House of Representatives, the Conference Committee substituted a version which would have made
the government liable for damages assessed against its own inhabitants if the judgment was not
satisfied by the inhabitants who had committed the deprivation of civil rights. 24 VILL. L. REV.
1008, 1011-12 (1979) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., IstSess. 725 (1871)).
17. 24 VILL. L. REV. 1008, 1011-12 (1979). The House rejected the substituted amendment as
well. As finally promulgated, the Sherman Amendment contained no reference to municipal
liability. Id. at 1012.
18. 365 U.S. at 191.
19. Id. at 191-92.
20. See, e.g., City ofKenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973) (section 1983 cannot support action
for injunction against city); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973) (section 1983 cannot
be used in conjunction with section 1988 to sustain damage action against county that could be held
liable under state law).
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directly under the Constitution, 21 invoking the theory developed in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the FederalBureau of Narcotics.21
The Bivens Court held that, absent a statutory remedy, courts have
inherent power to fashion common-law remedies for constitutional
wrongs. 23 Therefore, the Court in Bivens based its decision upon the
principle that for every violation of a federally guaranteed right
there should be an appropriate remedy. 24
Relief came to individuals whose constitutional rights had
been violated by municipal actions in Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 25 in which the Supreme Court expressly rejected the Monroe
holding that "local governments were not among the 'persons' to
whom 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies and were therefore wholly immune
from suit under the statute. "26 In Monell, the Supreme Court reevaluated the legislative history surrounding the Sherman
Amendment and concluded that the Monroe Court had
misconstrued the intent of Congress.2 7 The Court in Monell
attributed the defeat of the Sherman Amendment to the reluctance
of Congress to "obligate municipal corporations to keep the peace
if those corporations were neither so obligated nor so authorized by
their state charters. "28 Congress feared that to confer liability on a
municipality for damages caused by unauthorized acts of private
29
persons would be beyond the scope of its constitutional power.
The Court in Monell observed, however, that no one doubted
21. Note, Monel v. Department of Social Services: One Step Forward and a Haf Step Backjor Municipal
Liability Under Section 1983, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 893, 899 (1979).
22. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Federal jurisdiction in a Bivens-type action was provided in 28 U.S.C.
5 1331, which required a federal question and at least $10,000 in controversy. 403 U.S. at 398
(Harlan, J., concurring). The $10,000 in controversy requirement was dropped in 1980. Act of Dec.
1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 5 2(a), 94 stat. 2369 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. 5 1331 (West Supp.

1980)).
23. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
390-97 (1971). The facts of Bivens precluded application of section 1983. The plaintiff had claimed
injuries resulting from his arrest without probable cause and with the use of unreasonable force by
agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Even if the agents' conduct had been found to violate the
fourth amendment, no statutory reliefw as available. Section 1983 did not provide relief for wrongful
actions of a federal agency, because by its terms it applies only to unconstitutional actions committed
under color ofstate'law. The Court in Bivens rejected the defendants' argument that in the absence of
a federal statutory remedy only state remedies should apply by stating that a federal cause of action
could be based directly upon the fourth amendment. The Court concluded that a cause of action for
damages is a "remedial action normally available in the federal courts." Id.
24. Id. at 397.
25. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The plaintiffs, female employees of New York City's Department of
Social Services and Board of Education, were required by official policy to take an unpaid leave of
absence beginning in their fifth month of pregnancy. Plaintiffs, in a class action suit under section
1983, alleged that the forced maternity leave policy violated their constitutional rights. Id. at 660-62.
26. 445 U.S. at 624.
27. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700 (1978). The Court stated: "A
fresh analysis of debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and particularly of the case law which each
side mustered in its support, shows, however, that Monroe incorrectly equated the 'obligation'
[contained in the Sherman Amendment]... with 'civil liability' [under section 1983]." Id. at 665.
28. Id. at 668.
29. Id. The Court considered the constitutional arguments of both the supporters and opponents
of the Sherman Amendment, and pointed out that the debates on the amendment focused on
whether Congress had the power to create an obligation that municipalities keep the peace. Id. at
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Congress's ability under the fourteenth amendment to impose
liability upon municipalities when the municipality itself infringed
federal rights. 30 Thus, the Court found that the Congressional
debate over the Sherman Amendment could not support the
inference that municipalities were intended to be immune from
liability under section 1983.31
The Monell Court also considered whether the general
language describing those liable under section 1983 - "any
person" - could be read to encompass municipalities. Monell
overruled the determination in Monroe that the "word 'person' in
the Civil Rights Act did not include municipalities.' '32 The Court
found that the legislative discussion of section 1983 unequivocally
supported the position that section 1983 was intended to cover legal
persons - including municipal corporations - as well as natural
persons. 33 Therefore, because municipalities were "persons," they
3
were subject to suit directly under section 1983. 4
By permitting actions against municipalities under section
1983, the Monell Court was forced to decide whether the doctrine of
respondeat superior was applicable. 35 The Court held that "a
municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a
tortfeasor - or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held
liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. ",36 Thus, a
municipality, through an ordinance, regulation, custom, or policy,
must directly cause its employee to violate a constitutional right
before the municipality may be held liable for that employee's
37
conduct.
669-73.
30. Id. at 669. The debate on the Sherman Amendment "shows conclusively that the
constitutional objections raised . . . would not have prohibited congressional creation of a civil
remedy against state municipal corporations that infringed federal rights." Id.
31. Id. at 683.
32. Id. at 700. The Court reached this conclusion after examining the debates on section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871. Section 1 was later codified as section 1983, and was distinct from the
Sherman Amendment. Note, Municipal Immunity Withdrawn - Qualified Immunity Left As a Possibility,
1979 Wts. L. REV. 943, 946.
33. 436 U.S. at 683. The Court's finding was apparently based on the following considerations:
(1) the broad remedial goals of section 1983; (2) statements made by members of
Congress that actions by cities were redressable under section 1983; (3) the state of the
law concerning municipal corporations in 1871; and (4) the definition of the word
"person" in the Dictionary Act of 1871, which provided that unless the context
indicated to the contrary, the word "person" may be applied to "bodies politic and
corporate."
24 VLL. L. REV. 1008, 1022 (1979); see436 U.S. at 685-88.
34. 436 U.S. at 690.
35. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS S70, at 464 (4th ed. 1971). The doctrine of respondeat
superior, or "vicarious liability," holds an employer liable for negligent and intentional torts
committed by his employees within the scope of their employment. Id.
36. 436 U.S. at 691.
37. Id. at 694.
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The Court in Monell did not decide whether some form of
qualified immunity should be afforded municipalities, 38 and
expressly refused to address "what the full contours of municipal
liability under section 1983 may be. ' ' 39 Instead, it reserved
judgment on whether local governments, although not entitled to
absolute immunity, should be afforded some form of official
immunity in section 1983 suits. Therefore, the Court held that
local governments were no longer immune from liability under
section 1983 when the execution or implementation of one of its
policies, rules, or regulations violates a person's constitutional
right, but local governments remained partially immune under the
doctrine of respondeat superior.40 The Court refused, however, to
address the degree of immunity to be afforded a local governmental
41
entity.
The scope of a municipality's immunity from liability under
section 1983 was finally addressed in Owen v. City of Independence.41
In Owen, the city argued that, because its officials had acted in good
faith when the plaintiff was discharged from his position as police
chief, it was therefore immune from liability under section 1983.
The United States Supreme Cout rejected the city's assertion,
holding that municipalities are not entitled to rely on the good faith
of their officers as a defense in a 1983 action. 43 The Court began its
analysis with the language of the statute itself, since the scope of a
municipality's immunity from liability under section 1983 is
essentially a question of statutory construction. 44 By its terms,
section 1983 "creates a species of tort liability that on its face
admits no immunities."4' 5 The statute's language is absolute and
unqualified, with no mention of any privileges, immunities, or
defenses that may be asserted. 46 The Owen Court noted that the
statute imposes liability on "every person," and, as previously
held, these words were intended to encompass municipal
38. Id. at 701. The Court stated:
Since the question whether local government bodies should be afforded some
form of official immunity was not presented as a question to be decided . . . , we
express no views on the scope of any municipal immunity beyond holding that
municipal bodies sued under § 1983 cannot be entitled to an absolute immunity.

Id.
39. Id. at 695.
40. Id. at 690-91.
41. Id. at 701.
42. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
43. Id. at 638.
44. Id. at 635. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 56 (1979); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,
314 (1975).
45. 445 U.S. at 635 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976)).
46. 445 U.S. at 635.
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corporations as well as natural persons. 47 The Court also examined
the legislative history surrounding the passage of section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871,48 and concurred with the conclusion in
Monell that the expansive sweep of the language in section 1983
should be read as a broad remedy for violations of federally
49
protected rights.
The Owen Court noted that there have been several recent
decisions in which the scope of immunity under section 1983 for
state and local officials has been determined. 50 In each of these
cases, the finding of section 1983 immunity was predicated upon
"a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the
relevant official at common law and the interests behind it. "51
When the immunity claimed was well established at common law
at the time section 1983 was enacted, and when its rationale was
compatible with the Civil Rights Act, the Court noted that it has
construed the statute to incorporate such immunity. 5 2 The Court
found, however, that there is no tradition of immunity for
municipal corporations, and neither history nor policy supports a
construction of section 1983 that would accord qualified immunity
5
to a city. 1
The Owen Court recognized that two doctrines exist which do
afford municipal corporations some measure of protection from tort
liability. 54 The first doctrine creates a distinction between a
47. Id. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
48. 445 U.S. at 635-36. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was the forerunner of section
1983. Id. at 635.
49. Id. at 636. The Court focused on the remarks of Representative Shellabarger, the author of
the bill in the House, explaining the breadth of construction the Act was to receive:
I have a single remark to make in regard to the rule of interpretation of those
provisions of the Constitution under which all the sections of the bill are framed. This
act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of human liberty and human rights. All
statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are liberally and
beneficently construed. It would be most strange and, in civilized law, monstrous were
this not the rule of interpretation. As has been again and again decided by your own
Supreme Court of the United States, and everywhere else where there is wise judicial
interpretation, the largest latitude consistent with the words employed is uniformly
given in construing such statutes and constitutional provisions as are meant to protect
and defend and give remedies for their wrongs to all the people.
Id. (quoting CONo.GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1stSess., App. 68 (1871)).
50. 445 U.S. at 637. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (qualified immunity for
prison officials and officers); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (absolute immunity for
prosecutors in initiating and presenting the State's cases); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563
(1975) (qualified immunity for superintendent of state hospital); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975) (qualified immunity for local school board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974) (qualified good faith immunity for governor and other state executive officers for discretionary
acts performed in the course of official conduct).
51. 445 U.S. at 638 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976)).
52. 445 U.S. at 638.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 644.

100
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municipality's governmental and proprietary functions, 55 and
provides that the municipality's common-law immunity for
governmental functions is derived from the principle of sovereign
immunity. 5 6 The Court reasoned that, because sovereign immunity
insulates municipalities from unconsented suits altogether, the
presence or absence of good faith is irrelevant and therefore cannot
57
serve as a basis for qualified immunity.
The second doctrine recognized in Owen which protects
municipalities from tort liability creates a distinction between the
discretionary and ministerial activities of a municipality. 5 8 This
doctrine was not based upon the principle of sovereign immunity,
but upon a concern for separation of powers. 59 At common law,

this doctrine merely prevented courts from substituting their own
judgment on matters within the lawful discretion of the
municipality. 60 The Owen Court stated, however, that a
municipality has no "discretion to violate the Federal Constitution:
its dictates are imperative and absolute. "61 The Court concluded
that this doctrine therefore could not serve as the foundation for a
municipality's claimed good faith immunity under section 1983.62
Thus, through statutory construction and consideration of the two
traditional doctrines of tort liability for municipalities, the Court
discerned no well-grounded tradition or reason to extend qualified
immunity to municipalities based upon the good faith of their
officers.

63

The

Owen Court

also took

into account public

policy

55. See 18 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 53.23-.24 (3d rev. ed.
1977) [hereinafter cited as MCQUILLIN]. A municipality isliable for negligence to the same extent as
a private corporation or individual in the exercise of its proprietary functions. A municipality is not,
however, liable for injuries resulting from the wrongful acts of its officers in the exercise of strictly
governmental functions. Id.
56. 445 U.S. at 647.
57. Id. The immunity granted at common law for governmental functions is thus more
comparable to an absolute immunity from liability for conduct of a certain character, which defeats a
suit at the outset, than to a qualified immunity, which "depends upon the circumstances and
motivations of [the official'si actions, as established by the evidence at trial." Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976).
58. 445 U.S. at 644. See 18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 55, at §5 53.22(a)-(g). When the duty is
ministerial, the municipal corporation is liable for damages arising due to a failure to perform the
duty, or for negligence in its execution. When the duty is discretionary, there is no liability for failure
to exercise it or for errors ofjudgment in the exercise thereof. Id.
59. 445 U.S. at 648.
60. Id. at 649.
61. Id. The Court also stated that when any court passes judgment on a municipality's conduct
in a section 1983 action it does not attempt to second guess the reasonableness of the city's decision or
attempt to interfere with the government's resolution of competing policy considerations. Rather, it
considers only whether the municipality has conformed to the requirements of the federal
constitution and statutes. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 650. The Court was unwilling to suppose that injuries which resulted from a
municipality's unconstitutional conduct were not meant to be fully redressable through the sweep of
section 1983. Id.
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considerations and the legislative purposes for enacting the
statute. 64 The Court found that the main purpose of the Civil
Rights Act was to provide protection to those persons wronged by
the "misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of
state law." ' 65 The Court determined that it would be "uniquely
amiss" if the government itself-" 'the social organ to which all in
our society look for the promotion of liberty, justice, fair and equal
treatment, and the setting of worthy norms and goals for social
conduct' - were permitted to disavow liability for the injury it has
begotten." 6 6 Since many individual officials already enjoy qualified
immunity from liability, many victims of municipal malfeasance
would be left without a remedy if the city were allowed to assert the
67
good faith of its officials as a defense.
The Owen Court reasoned that section 1983 was intended not
only to provide compensation to the victims of past abuses, but to
serve as a deterrent against future constitutional deprivations as
well. 6 8 A damage award against a municipality would act as a
deterrent, and would thereby encourage stricter policies and closer
supervision of "officials who may doubt the lawfulness of their
intended actions. "69 Because of potential liability, officials
presumably will now be more protective of citizens' constitutional
rights. 70
Finally, the Court reasoned that the public policy
considerations which demand that municipal officials be given a
measure of protection from personal liability are less compelling,
and may be inapplicable, when the liability of a municipal entity is
at issue.7 1 The Court cited Scheuer v. Rhodes,7" in which the Court
identified two mutually dependent rationales upon which the
doctrine of official immunity rested. The rationales noted in Scheuer
64. Id.
65. Id. (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961)). By creating an express federal
remedy, Congress sought to enforce provisions of the fourteenth amendment against those who carry
a badge of authority of a state and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with
their authority or misuse it. 365 U.S. at 171-72.
66. 445 U.S. at 651 (quoting Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190 (1970) (state-enforced
custom requiring racial segregation in restaurants established section 1983 claim)).
67. 445 U.S. at 651.
68. Id. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1978) (Louisiana survivorship law
does not adversely affect section 1983's role in preventing official illegality); Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247, 256-57 (1978) (students suspended from school without procedural due process entitled to
recover only nominal damages).
69. 445 U.S. at 652.
70. Id. The threat that damages might be levied against the city may encourage those in
policymaking positions to institute internal rules and programs designed to minimize the likelihood
of unintentional infringements on constitutional rights. Id.
71. Id.at 653.
72. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
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were the injustice of subjecting an officer who is required by law to
exercise discretion to liability, particularly in the absence of bad
faith, and "the danger that the threat of such liability would deter
his willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and
judgment required by the public good. ' ' 71 The Owen Court
reasoned that the first consideration is inapplicable when the
damage award does not come from the official's pocket, but rather
comes from the public treasury. 74 It is hardly unjust, noted the
Court, to require a municipal defendant which has violated a
citizen's constitutional rights to compensate him for the injury
suffered. 75 In fact, the Court stated, Congress enacted section 1983
precisely to provide a remedy for such abuses of official power. 76
The Court then determined that the second rationale in Scheuer
also loses its force when a municipality's liability, rather than an
official's liability, is at issue. 77 The Owen Court noted that the
inhibiting effect on an official's decisiveness during the
decisionmaking process is significantly reduced when the threat of
personal liability is removed. 78 It is also questionable whether
potential municipal loss will deter a public officer. from the
conscientious exercise of his duties. 79 The Court reasoned that a
decisionmaker would in fact be derelict in his duties if at some point
he did not consider whether his decisions were in agreement with
the Constitution and weigh the risk that a constitutional violation
might result in a damage award from the public treasury.8 0
Therefore, based upon statutory construction, common law,
legislative intent, and public policy, the Owen Court concluded that
a municipality has no immunity from liability for its constitutional
73. 445 U.S. at 654 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974)). See also Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320 (1978). In Wood, the Court mentioned a third justification for
extending qualified immunity to public officials: the fear that the threat of personal liability might
deter citizens from holding public office. Id.
74. 445 U.S. at 654.
75. Id. The Court noted the common argument that revenue raised by taxation for public use
should not be diverted to the benefit of a single or discrete group of taxpayers, especially when the
municipality has at all times acted in good faith. The Court dismissed this argument, reasoning that
it is the public at large which enjoys the benefits of the government's activities, and it is the public at
large which is ultimately responsible for its administration. Id. at 654-55.
76. Id. at 654. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961).
77. 445 U.S. at 655.
78. Id. at 656.
79. Id. In fact, stated the Court, city officials routinely make decisions which either require a
large expenditure of municipal funds or involve a substantial risk of depleting municipal funds. Id.
80. Id. As one commentator has aptly noted:
Whatever other concerns should shape a particular official's actions, certainly one
by his
of them should be the constitutional rights of individuals who will be affected
actions. To criticize section 1983 liability because it leads decisionmakers to avoid the
infringement ofconstitutional rights is to criticize one of the statute's raisonsd'etre.
Note, Developments in theLaw: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV, 1133, 1224 (1977).

CASE COMMENT

violations under section 1983 and may not rely upon the good faith
of its officers as a defense. 1I
The implication of the Owen decision is that governmental
bodies will increasingly be required to respond to the substance of
charges that they have acted in an unconstitutional manner. After
Owen, victims of unconstitutional acts will have a greater likelihood
of recovery because they will now have a cause of action against the
municipal entity, and not only against the local officials, who are
entitled to immunity if they have acted in good faith. 82 The decision
also establishes that good faith will not be a defense for
municipalities, even if the action taken was valid under thencurrent law but is later determined to be unconstitutional. 83 This
expanded liability may result in a financial strain on some local
governments. A ruinous judgment under section 1983 could
imperil a municipality's financial stability, and thereby severely
limit its ability to serve the public.8 4 The need for municipalities to
insulate their treasuries through insurance or liability limitations
will be imperative.
The holding in Owen conflicts with the current law in fortyfour states. Each of these jurisdictions provides municipal
immunity analogous to the good faith defense against liability for
constitutional torts. 85 North Dakota law creates municipal tort
immunity, but bars recovery for injuries caused by discretionary
acts or by the good faith execution of a validly enacted, -although
unconstitutional, regulation.8 6 This is the form of qualified
81. 445-U.S. at 657.
82. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-49 (1974).
83. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
In Roth and Perry, the Supreme Court crystallized the rule establishing the right to a name-clearing
hearing for a government employee allegedly stigmatized in the course of his discharge. The Court
decided these two cases two months after Owen had been discharged as chief of police. The city
council of Independence could not have been expected to predict the Perry and Roth decisions. While
that might excuse officials from liability, the Court held that it offered no excuse for the City. 445
U.S. at 655.
84. 445 U.S. at 670 (Powell, J., dissenting).
85. Idat 680-83. Twelve states have laws creating municipal tort liability but which bar
damages for injuries caused by discretionary decisions or by the good faith execution of
validly enacted, although unconstitutional, regulations.
Five states have retained the
governmental/proprietary distinction, while two states grant even broader protection for municipal
corporations. Statutes in four states protect local governments from tort liability except for particular
injuries, such as those due to motor vehicle accidents or negligent maintenance of public facilities. In
one state, local governments are not liable for injuries caused by the execution with due care of any
officially enacted statute or regulation. Sixteen states follow the traditional rule disallowing recovery
for damages resulting from discretionary decisions which are made within authority granted to
particular officers or organs of government. In four states, local governments enjoy complete
immunity from tort actions unless they are covered by liability insurance. Only five states impose the
blanket liability construed by the Owen court. Id.
86. N.D. CENT. CODE S 32-12.1-03(3) (a) (Supp. 1979). Subsection (3) (a) provides:
3. A political subdivision shall not be liable for any claim based upon an act or
omission of an employee of a political subdivision, exercising due care, in the
execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid,
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immunity which has been granted to executive officials under
section 1983,7 but which now cannot be extended to municipalities
under Owen. 8 8 Therefore, it appears that the North Dakota statute
may be invalid under the Owen standards.
The Owen decision chips away at the already eroded historical
concept of sovereign immunity. The holding, however, is in
keeping with current notions of governmental responsibility: the
innocent individual who has been harmed by an abuse of
governmental authority should be, and now may be, compensated
for his injury.
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or based upon the exercise or performance, exercising due care, or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a political
subdivision or its employees, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
Specifically, a political subdivision or an employee thereof shall not be liable for any
claim which results from:
a. The decision to undertake or the refusal to undertake any legislative or
quasi-legislative act, including the decision to adopt or the refusal to adopt any
statute, charter, ordinance, order, regulation, resolution, or resolve.
Id.
87. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (qualified immunity for prison
officials and officers); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (qualified immunity for local school
board members).
88. 445 U.S. at 638.

